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RACIAL RESTRICTIONS IN REAL ESTATE -
PROPERTY VALUES VERSUS HUMAN VALUES*
Our system of law can hope to withstand the vicissitudes
of the social revolutions rampant in the world today only
by maintaining close liaison with justice and with social
reality. Unfortunately, too often a double hiatus intervenes,
and our jurisprudence presents, in spots, a denuded skeleton
from which the heart and soul have been removed. When
that occurs, when the law finds itself out of step with right
and blind to truth, then a readjustment somehow must be
made, or its desiccation soon will follow. When a citizenry
becomes aware that its judicial oracles and legal ritualisms
serve only as flimsy facades for the maldistribution of poli-
tical, economic, and social freedoms, then the hour is one ripe
for sudden and violent upheaval.'
Happily, our own top oracle, the Supreme Court of the
United States, has been alive to the danger of allowing the
law to lag too far behind the times over which it attempts
dominion. Indeed, in the field of civil liberties the Supreme
Court seems determined to have the great generalities of
the Constitution (and especially those of the Fourteenth
Amendment) instilled with a strong, impartial, and socially
* The writer wishes to express his deep appreciation to Mr. Burton M.
Apker, 1948 graduate of the Notre Dame College of Law and former note editor
of the Notre Dame Lawyer, whose intelligent, co-operative, and painstaking re-
search made this article possible. In addition, a kudo must be tossed in the
direction of Professor Anton-Hermann Chroust, of the faculty of Notre Dame.
He provided, in a large measure, the intellectual stimulation which evoked many
of the views herein expressed.
1 An example can be found in the infamous Dred Scott case. A Supreme
Court majority, blinded by their racial and sectional prejudices and predilections,
gave to an already divided nation a decision which intensified that division,
irreparably damaged the reputation of the Supreme Court, and hastened the
violent crisis which followed. See SwrsHER, AmEcAl CONsTrIrUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MNT 243-251 (1943). Ominous rumblings of a dangerous societal unrest can be
detected in the alarming suggestion of some Negro leader that Negro youths
refuse induction into the nation's armed forces so long as an official policy of
segregation therein continues in effect. See, e.g., Randolph, Revolt Against Jim
Crow. The Progressive, May, 1948, p. 18.
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realistic meaning. In short, they seem bent on assuring to
everyone, regardless of race, creed, color, or ethnic origin
the broad protections of the basic charter of our democratic
republic.
Examination of the many examples of this judicial evan-
gelizing in the sphere of civil liberties lies beyond the pro-
vince of this article.' Herein the writer wishes to treat of a
recent chapter in the current attempt to revitalize the Four-
teenth Amendment, namely, the Supreme Court decisions,
and ramifications thereof, in which a unanimous Court struck
down as unconstitutional judicial enforcement of restrictive
real estate covenants that discriminated against certain
minorities.' The fundamental problem involved in such a
study is whether the courts should enforce real estate agree-
ments that bar a fellow citizen from occupying this house
or that because of the color of his skin, the nature of his
religious beliefs, or the character of his national origin.4
This inquiry presents an appropriate field of investigation
within which may be witnessed the clash of so-called "pro-
perty rights" with the powerful moral forces involved in any
2 "The Roosevelt Court has, then, expanded its power in the only direction
where such expansion is compatible with a democratic constitutionalism-in the
direction of safeguarding the right to believe, to speak, to assemble, to practice
one's religion, to have a fair trial." PRrTCHEIr, THE RoosEvELT CouRT 285 (1948),
reviewed in 24 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 142 (1948). See also SwIsHER, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 329-343; Note, Applicability Of The Fourteenth Amendment To Private
Organizations, 61 IHkv. L. REv. 344 (1948). For the view of at least one of the
present Supreme Court Justices who feels that the Court has not yet gone far
enough in this direction, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
3 Shelley et ux. v. Kraemer et al. and McGhee et ux. v. Sipes et ux., 334
U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847 (1948).
These cases have been noted, among other publications, in 23 NOTRE DAws LAWYER
256 (1948); 46 MIcH. L.REv. 978 (1948) and 24 So. CAia'. L.REv. 358 (1948). The
vote was six to nothing. Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge disqualified them-
selves, presumably on the grounds that they held property bound by restrictive
covenants.
4 Real estate restrictions of various sorts have been drawn to restrict real
property from sale to and occupancy by Mexicans, Armenians, Chinese, Japanese,
Jews, Persians, Syrians, Filipinos, American Indians, "non-Caucasians", and
Negroes. U. S. D=, . or JusTicE, PETuoicE AND PROPERTY 18 (1948).
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program of attempted racial segregation ' and reflected in
the imposing statistical data which gives cold and unchal-
lengeable evidence of the grossly inferior housing accommo-
dations of certain minority groups in America.6 On the one
side are raised the hoaried shibboleths of "freedom of con-
tract" and "freedom to choose one's neighbors". On the
other we shall encounter broad constitutional principles,
calling for equal protection of the law, resting on a firm
belief of the equality of human dignity, and re-enforced by
overwhelming factual testimony of the dreadful housing
situation which afflicts at least one of our great minority
groups, the American Negro.
It shall not be the purpose of this article to point up the
very heavy social costs which inhere in any policy of racial
segregation by private contract. Many studies have demon-
strated beyond cavil the menace to health, to morals, and
to the general decency of cities,7 the plague spot for racial
exploitations, frictions, and riots,' the media for crime, juve-
5 See, e.g., the remarks of Most Reverend Bernard J. Sheil, Auxiliary Bishop
of Chicago, contained in SH=nn, RAcIAL RasmRicTivF CovENANTs 25-31 (1946).
His Excellency puts the case in strong terms when he remarks: "When smug,
complacent idolators of the status quo, or so-called defenders of property rights
deny to any human being the opportunity to live on terms of honest, objective
equality, they are denying the Son of God."
G "Nothing is so obvious about the Negroes' level of living as the fact that
most of them suffer from poor housing conditions. It is a matter of such common
knowledge that it does not need much emphasis." M-viAL, THE AmancA
Di-EitAr 376 (1944). The accuracy of Mr. Myrdal's observation is substantiated
by a tremendous body of social and statistical studies including DRAxE Axn CAY-
TON, BLACx METROPOIaS ch. 8 (1945); WOOTER, NEGRO PROBLES IN CTIES
(1928); STERNER, TnE NEGRO'S SHIAR (1943). The social pattern of racial dis-
crimination in housing has not, of course, been -restricted to Negroes only. See
TAYLOR, MamacAN LABOR IN THE UNITED SATES 80, 208 (1928); TAYLOR, AN
AmaICAN M nXCAN FRONTIER 226 (1934). KONVITz, TE Aswrric IN AimIcA
LAw 168 (1948).
7 REPORT ON NEGRO HOUSING 45-46 (1932).
8 LEE, R.AcE Rior 60, 89, 93, 119 (1943) wherein it is made unmistakably
clear that the ominous threat of violence and bloodshed is an integral part of any
pattern of racial discrimination in housing. On the other hand, the experience of
the 1943 Detroit race riot revealed that peace prevailed only in the non-segregated
areas of the city. See Walter White's autobiography, A MAN CALTLE W3IT 72,
73, 226, 228 (1948).
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nile delinquency and prostitution,9 and the proportionally
greater expense to the community in required police, fire,
and health services,' ° which a policy of legalized ghetto
housing has caused. Moreover, we shall leave for theologians
the appraisal of the moral dilemma involved in tolerating
what have been aptly termed the "legalistic concentration
camps of America"." Inquiry here will restrict itself to an
examination of the legal effects of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions concerning racial restrictive covenants and to
an examination of the legality or illegality and the practi-
cability or disutility of certain schemes to circumvent the
Supreme Court's ruling. If such an approach seems to be
a parochial curtailment of what obviously is a fundamental
philosophical issue, the writer can only plead the limitations
of time, space, and the selected channel of expression.' 2
A resume of the general status of the law governing racial
restrictive covenants should serve to set the stage for an
analysis of the recent Supreme Court decisions. Racial re-
strictive covenants were of three general types. One type
restricted either sale, lease, conveyance to, or ownership by,
any member of an excluded group. The second type pro-
hibited use or occupancy by any member of such group. The
third prohibited both ownership and occupancy. Some of
the covenants were limited in duration while others were
perpetual. The use of racial restrictive covenants grew in
popularity with the great migration of the Negroes from the
country to the city and from the South to the Northern and
9 A Chicago housing conference listed among the "ghetto" conditions high
sickness and death rates; a heavy relief burden during the Great Depression;
inadequate recreational facilities; lack of building repairs; neglect of garbage dis-
posal and street cleaning services; overcrowded schools; high rates of crime and
juvenile delinquency; and rough treatment by the police. DRAKE "D CAYTON,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 202 (1945).
10 See generally MooN, TuE HIGH COST OF PREJUDICE (1947).
11 SH=, op. cit. supra note 5, at 28.
12 It would appear that there never has been adequate philosophical treat-
ment of the problem of applying civil liberties in a constitutional democracy
Some of those philosopher-lawyers who are wont to decry, at length, recent
alleged manifestations of government absolutism, would be performing a great
service if they would turn just a bit of their intense efforts in this direction.
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Middle Western states.13 Their continued use was made an
absolute necessity in maintaining racial restrictions in real
estate when the Supreme Court in 1917 invalidated state
and municipal efforts to enforce urban residential segrega-
tion on the grounds that it offended the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.14
As a general proposition such covenants have been held
not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, since that great
effort to insure human liberty, because of the double restric-
tion of a judicial myopia and a petrifying stare decisis, has
been held applicable only to state action and not to the con-
duct of private individuals. 5 Since such covenants are the
matter of private agreement their immunity from constitu-
tional condemnation followed.' However it might be noted
that at least one lower federal court thought them uncon-
stitutional." Racial restrictive covenants which were lim-
13 Miller, A Right Secured, The Nation, May 29, 1948, p. 599. See the inter-
esting figures on the increase of metropolitan Negro populations in PRFyuDICE AND
PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 13. See also Walter White's description of the prob-
lem. WmmT, A MAN CALLED WHITE 304 (1948).
14 Buchanan v. Warley 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917).
In this decision -the Supreme Court rejected the spurious "separate but equal"
argument which had been successfully used in sustaining the validity of segrega-
tion legislation in the fields of education and public transportation. The Court
pointed out that, since land is a unique commodity, it is impossible to provide
"equal" housing locations. The municipal racial zoning ordinance in that case was,
therefore, a violation of the equal protection clause and not justified as a reason-
able exertion of the police power.
15 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). Whether
this interpretation was one in accord with the original congressional intent is highly
questionable. See FLAC, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH A1MENDMENr
(1908); SwIsHER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 329-334.
I' Corrigan et al. v. Buddey, 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969
(1924) where the Supreme Court, without a discussion on the merits, dismissed
an appeal from a lower federal court which had upheld the validity of a racial
restrictive covenant in the District of Columbia. The Court merely noted that it
was without jurisdiction since no substantial federal question was raised. Although
there was a wayside nibble to the effect that court enforcement of such covenants
would not violate the Fifth Amendment, the point had not been argued and cer-
tainly was not conclusively decided in the case. See McGowney, Racial Resi-
dential Segregation By State Court Enforcement Of Restrictive Agreements, Cove-
nants Or Conditions In Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 CAUTa. L. Rxv. 1 (1945).
'7 Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (1892) where Judge Ross made it
very clear that for the court to enforce a covenant in a deed providing that the
grantee should never rent the property "to a Chinaman" would be a denial of
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ited to "use or occupancy" have been held not to violate
the rule against restraints on the alienation of realty."8
The rationale was that the restraints of this sort were
reasonable measures to protect real property values. The
analogy relied on was the field of building restriction
litigation where the right of landowners to contract with
each other as to the future use which their property could
be put had been sustained. The fallaciousness of this com-
parison will be referred to later. However, some courts
balked when the restriction was unlimited as to time, and
held them to be, in such a case, an unreasonable restraint."
As to covenants prohibiting sale to certain racial groups,
there existed a split of authority. Earlier decisions invali-
dated them on the grounds that such a restriction consti-
tuted an absolute restraint on alienation since the restriction
was against all of a race all of the time.2" Later decisions
adopted the somewhat strained rationale that restraints as
to sale were not unreasonable since they were only limited in
scope, i.e., they applied only to one group.2 ' This line of
reasoning can be criticized on the theory that it has con-
veniently overlooked the fact that these covenants almost
always bar more than one race or religion.
Nor had attacks on these covenants based on considera-
tions of public policy enjoyed much success.22 It is true that
equal protection of the laws. Moreover, the court relied on provisions of a treaty
with China to justify the decision. Indeed, Judge Ross appears in this decision
as a man who was far ahead of his times!
18 See particularly Meade v. Dennistone et al., 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330,
114 A.L.R. 1227 (1938); Porter et al. v. Johnson et al., 232 Mo. App. 1150, 115
S.W. (2d) 529 (1938); Thornhill et al. v. Herdt et al., 130 S.W. (2d) 175
(Mo. 1939).
19 Foster et al. v. Stewart et al., 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P. (2d) 497 (1933).
The case seems later to have been impliedly overruled on the point in Burkhardt v.
Lofton et al., 63 Cal. App. (2d) 230, 146 P. (2d) 720 (1944).
20 Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559 (1931); Bulen v.
Rice, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 175 (1931); Doherty et al. v. Rice et al., 240 Wis. 389,
3 N.W. (2d) 734 (1942).
21 Steward v. Cronan et al., 105 Colo. 393, 98 P. (2d) 999 (1940); Lyons v.
Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P. (2d) 555 (1942); Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski,
23 N. J. Mis. Rep. 290, 43 A. (2d) 729 (1945).
22 The courts on frequent occasions have refused to discuss the public policy
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Pennsylvania seemed to have outlawed them through judicial
decisions, although the point had not been settled with final-
ity.2" The very great majority of state tribunals, however,
had either rejected arguments based upon public policy or
ignored them entirely.2 Public policy arguments were rele-
gated to secondary consideration. The primary issue seemed
to be whether a particular restrictive covenant violated the
rule against restraints on alienation. If this were not the
case, the covenants were allowed to stand.
Moreover, this tendency to emphasize dry, historical ab-
stractions concerning property concepts was aided by the
manner in which the question arose. The earliest cases were
suits at law for forfeiture on breach of condition.25  The
precedents thus laid down had their roots in an atmosphere
of excessive emphasis on contract rights, an emphasis which
was carried over into the later cases where equitable relief
was the remedy sought. Normally, in decisions involving
requests for the assistance of the "long arm of equity" con-
stitutional and public policy questions occupy a position of
paramountcy. 6 In the cases dealing with racial restrictive
covenants they were slighted to a large extent, and contract
"rights" became the dominant, if unrealistic theme.
It could be noted that the courts who pitched their deci-
sions in these cases solely on alleged principles of contract
aspects of granting equitable relief in these cases. See e.g., Porter v. Johnson,
supra note 18; Burkhardt v. Lofton, supra note 19.
23 Ellsworth v. Stewart, 9 Erie County L. J. 305, 311 (Pa. 1928); Yoshido v.
Gelbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321 (1946). Although these cases
treated of permanent restrictions on sale, the language of the court in both cases
would seem to outlaw all racial restrictions.
24 Steward v. Cronan et al., 105 Colo. 393, 98 P. (2d) 999 (1940); Mays
et al. v. Burgess et al., 147 F. (2d) 869 (D. C. App. 1945), 79 U. S. A. D. C. '343.
In rejecting public policy arguments the usual technique was to point the fact that
the legislature had not forbidden the practice of racial restrictive conditions in
deeds of property. It was felt, therefore, beyond the proper functions of the
court to do so. See, e.g., Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski, supra note 21.
25 Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux et al., 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
26 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Holmes' remarks in Beasley v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.,
191 U. S. 492, 497, 24 S. Ct. 164, 48 L. Ed. 274 (1903).
27 Miller, Race Restrictions On Ownership Or Occupancy Of Land, 7 LAw.
Gurw REv. 99, 101 (1947).
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law were in reality making a choice of public policy. In
effect, as Dean Ribble has accurately appraised it,
... a court's finding that a restraint is reasonable and con-
sequently valid, is simply a way of saying that the court
believes that the policies favoring the [racial] restraint out-
weigh the policies opposed to it, so that the state's welfare
is better served by allowing the validity of the restraint than
by denying it.28
However, it must not be thought that in all cases wherein
racial restrictive covenants were sought to be enforced there
were no successful defenses open to the defendant property
purchasers. At least one federal court thought racial restric-
tions were unconstitutional, and, moreover, in that particu-
lar case held that they violated the treaty power.2" Further-
more, they seemed to be outlawed in at least one state as
contrary to public policy." In addition to these isolated
examples of judicial refusal to enforce racial restrictive cove-
nants because of broad considerations of constitutionality
and public policy, there were some technical defenses which
sometimes were successfully asserted by the defendant pro-
perty purchaser. For instance, a substantial change in the
restricted district or adjoining neighborhood would at times
lead a court to deny enforcement of the racial covenant.31
The defense was given a strict construction by the courts
and the test applied was, whether the infiltration of the ex-
cluded group had caused such a change in the neighborhood
that it would be to the pecuniary advantage of the property
owners to remove the restriction and permit them to sell out-
side the restriction.8 2
28 Ribble, Legal Restraints on the Choice of a Dwelling, 78 U. OF PA. L. REv.
842, 847 (1930).
29 Gandolfo v. Hartman, supra note 17.
30 Supra note 23.
31 Fairchild et al. v. Raines et al.. 24 Cal. (2d) 818, 151 P. (2d) 260 (1944);
Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F. (2d) 23, 77 U. S. A. D. C. 48 (D. C. App. 1942). See
extended discussion in 162 A.L.R. 187 (1946).
82 See, e.g., Grady v. Garland et al., 89 F. (2d) 817, 67 A. D. C. 73 (D. C.
App., 1937).
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Again, the ancient doctrine of laches, abandonment, and
waiver of enforcement had sometimes been successfully in-
voked. 3 Miscellaneous other defenses once in a while had
saved the day for the purchasers of property covered by
racial restrictions. They included technical deficiencies in
signatures on mutual covenants,34 and ambiguities in the
agreement itself which afforded a chance for application of
the rule of strict construction of an instrument against the
grantor.35 All these successful technical defenses were the
exception, however, not the rule.
A short resum6 of the legal aspects of racial restrictive
covenants, plus just a brief reference to the more recent
sociological background prior to the recent Supreme Court
pronouncements on the subject, should serve to introduce
that decision. Racial restrictive covenants did not in them-
selves violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of either the Federal Constitution or those of the states."
Whether judicial enforcement of these covenants violated
the constitutional prohibitions had not been squarely de-
cided although there were off hand dicta to the effect it did
not. Whether they could be interpreted as outlawed by
certain treaty obligations on the part of the United States
had scarcely been considered, although one perspicacious
federal judge had given a hearty affirmative. 8s Public policy
considerations were no barrier to the enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants although one state," along with
Canada, 0 had felt otherwise. Restraints on sale, as opposed
33 See cases cited and discussed in 162 A.L.R. 194 (1946).
34 Jones, Legality Of Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 NATIoNAL B. J.
14, 25 (1946).
35 Kathan et al. v. Stevenson et ux., 307 Mich. 485, 12 N.W. (2d) 332 (1942).
36 Corrigan et al. v. Buckley, supra note 16.
37 Ibid.
38 Gandolfo v. Hartman, supra note 17.
39 SuPra note 23.
40 Re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (1945). But cf. Re McDougall and
Weddell, 2 D.L.R. 244 (1945). Moreover, the Ontario Supreme Court has recently,
in an unreported case, upheld a covenant restricting Jews and Negroes from pur-
chasing or occupying certain summer resort property on Lake Huron. The prin-
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to restraints on occupancy and use, had, however, been
struck down as offending against the rule prohibiting re-
straints on alienation. Moreover, there were isolated ex-
amples of successful assertion of technical defenses.
While restrictive covenants might have seemed to the
socially myopic quite secure from the possibilities of suc-
cessful legal attack, the concentrated pressures of ghetto
housing conditions were beginning to make a severe chal-
lenge to their continued immunity and their divorcement
from the realities of our society. Previous reference has been
made to the many sociological and statistical surveys which
accurately and dramatically painted the dismal picture of
the effects of racial discrimination in housing. The problem
had been less acute in the "Age of the Great Depression"
since Negro migration to Northern cities had decreased
greatly. However, with World War II came an acute hous-
ing shortage plus a great influx of Negro war workers to
the great urban centers. With the boosted income which
the Negro war worker was receiving he was able more suc-
cessfully to compete in the market for lower and middle-
class housing. Numerous sales in violation of racial restric-
tive covenants followed and the stage was set for a battle
in which the Supreme Court finally had to speak, in what,
it is hoped, will be the last word on the question.
The racial restrictive covenant cases which were joined
and brought before the Supreme Court for decision at the
last term illustrate three different types of these discrimina-
tory real estate devices. Shelley et ux. v. Kraemer et al.,
cipal ground upon which prior decisions disallowing racial covenants were dis-
tinguished was that the previous cases had dealt with shelter, in the instant case thE
court felt the main purpose of the resident was recreationl Is there no limit
to the artificial rationalizations which some courts can conjure up when they
wish to sustain racial and religious discriminatory practices? See Shelter But No
Fun, New Republic, July 5, 1948, p. 8. In the Re Drummond Wren case the
Ontario High Court had relied, in part, on Canadian adherence to Articles 55c
and 56g of the United Nations Charter which pledge the member nations to
active steps in removing racial discriminations. Apparently the court believes
that a summer colony enjoys a peculiar immunity from treaty commitments.
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one of the state cases, involved a restrictive covenant limit-
ing use and occupancy to the "Caucasian race" for fifty
years. The condition ran with the land and was to be a
condition precedent to the valid sale of the same. The
owners of various parcels of land subject to the terms of
the restrictive covenant brought suit against a Negro pur-
chaser, Shelley, who had bought without knowledge of the
restriction. The relief prayed for was that Shelley be re-
strained from taking possession, and that judgment be en-
tered divesting title out of Shelley and revesting it in the
immediate grantor or such person as the court might direct.
After being denied relief before the trial court on a techni-
cality, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and granted
the relief requested, holding inter alia that the covenant
violated no provisions of the Federal Constitution."
The second case involving an appeal from a state -supreme
court ruling was Sipes et al. v. McGhee et ux.4" There the
restriction was once more limited to the anthropological
elite, the members of the "Caucasian race". This time, how-
ever, the barrier against alleged racial inferiors was to run
forever. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
decision directing the Negro purchasers to move from their
property within ninety days and enjoining them from using
or occupying the premises in the future.
The third of the racial and religious restrictive trilogy
was Hurd v. Hodge, a case wherein appeal was made from
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia which had upheld a restrictive covenant on
property located in the District of Columbia.4" Here the
prohibition was extended to sale, in addition to occupancy,
and was to run indefinitely. The Circuit Court had sus-
tained a judgment of the District Court declaring the sale
to a Negro purchaser null and void, enjoining the Negro
41 Kraemer et ux. v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W. (2d) 679 (1946).
42 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947).
48 162 F. (2d) 233 (D.C. App. 1947).
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purchasers from leasing or conveying the properties, and
directing them "to remove themselves and all of their per-
sonal belongings" from the enclave of white supremacy which
they had invaded. It should be noted, however, that this
last decision was punctuated by a courageous, brilliant, and
devastating dissent on the part of Associate Justice Henry
Edgerton of the circuit court of appeals. Indeed, Justice
Edgerton's dissent was a classic in the Holmes-Brandeis
tradition. It undoubtedly served to focus the attention of
the Supreme Court on the problem and to induce an authori-
tative ruling on the points involved.44
Although the three cases involved different types of racial
restrictive covenants, all three presented fundamentally the
same constitutional issues. Specifically, the prime question
to be decided was whether judicial enforcement of the re-
strictive covenants violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Of
course, in the District of Columbia case, the contention was
that such judicial enforcement violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Analysis of the opinion of
the Court discussion of Hurd v. Hodge will be taken up
after appraisal of the Court's ruling concerning state judi-
cial enforcement of restrictive covenants.
The first hurdle to be judicially cleared was the imposing
figure of Corrigan v. Buckley, where it had been decided that
restrictive covenants, as such, do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 Moreover, there was the dicta in that deci-
sion which indicated that judicial enforcement of the cove-
nants was likewise free from any constitutional defects. 6
44 Justice Edgerton would strike down restrictive covenants as "void because
contrary to public policy," and void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
He regarded judicial granting of equitable injunctive relief in such cases as for-
bidden by the Constitution, by the Civil Rights Act, and by principles of equity.
As he so penetratingly put it: "Suits like these, and the ghetto system they en-
force, are among our conspicuous failures to live together in peace". Hurd v.
Hodge, supra note 43, 246.
45 Corrigan v. Buckley, supra note 16.
46 Counsel had argued in Corrigan v. Buckley that judicial enforcement
would violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. To this the Court
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In the instant case the Supreme Court thrust Corrigan v.
Buckley aside by the ingenious, but not entirely accurate
technique, of saying that decision was not an adjudication
on the merits of the constitutional issues now raised. Cor-
rigan v. Buckley stood only for the proposition that the pro-
hibitive force of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments
do not apply to the actions of private individuals.
4 7
With stare decisis removed as an obstacle, the Court then
plunged forward to analyze the nature and purpose of re-
strictive covenants. It is to their everlasting credit that
the Court rejected the spurious analogies to building and
land use restrictions,48 a concept which many courts had
accepted in the past. The Court pointed out the obvious
fact, that racial and religious restrictive covenants are di-
rected not at the use made of the property, but rather at
the user of the property, the prohibited racial group. The
judicial realism which the Court demonstrated in piercing
the purely semantic similarity between land use restrictions
and race use restrictions is commendable. After all, restric-
tions prohibiting land to be used for saloons, slaughter
houses, and manufacturing plants exuding noxious vapors
and ringing with the disturbing cacophony of an industrial
bedlam, have a reasonable relation to the public health,
safety, and the general welfare.5 0 Racial restrictions on
property purchases carry no such implied justification. In
fact, the point was settled in Buchanan v. Warley "' wherein
racial zoning by a municipality was struck down as uncon-
stitutional, with the Court there making the point that racial
zoning has no relevancy "to the public health, safety, moral
or general welfare." 52
there turned a deaf ear saying,"... it likewise is lacking in substance." 271 U. S.
323, 331, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926).
47 68 S. Ct. 836, 840.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 See, e.g., Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55, 25 L.Ed. 547 (1879).
51 Supra note 14.
52 See Miller, op. cit. supra note 27, at 101.
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Having exposed the false analogy between land use re-
strictions and land user restrictions the Court approaches
more. closely to the legal heart of the matter: do these racial
restrictive covenants offend in the constitutional sense?
While the writer appreciates the fact that the barnacles of
stare decisis would make any direct outlawing of racial re-
strictive covenants in this decision a rather rash reversal of
entrenched constitutional doctrine, he does regret certain
unnecessary remarks made by the Chief Justice, who wrote
the opinion. After making it clear that one of the civil
rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment was the right to ac-
quire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property, he goes on to
give aid and comfort to those who wish to vitiate the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting it to the dry
letter, or less. The Chief Justice remarked that the Four-
teenth Amendment touches only state actions, and does not
provide a shield against "merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful".5" He concludes, therefore, that
restrictive covenants standing alone and effectuated only by
voluntary adherence, remain in the constitutionally immune
sphere of private conduct and do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. This unnecessary dicta is, as Professor Frank
has recently pointed out,5" the most unfortunate aspect of
the decision. The recent growing demand, dramatically ar-
ticulated by Justice Black's well documented dissent in the
Adamson case,55 for a return to what is believed to be th6
proper original Congressional intent in passing the Four-
teenth Amendment,5" should warrant judgment on the merits
of the issue when specifically raised. Wayside nibbles couched
in unnecessary dicta serve only to confuse the issue, deter
53 68 S. Ct. 836, 842.
54 Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. oF Cni. L. REv.
1 (1948)'.
55 See Note 2 supra. See also Coudert, Adamson v. California and the Bill
of Rights, 34 A.B.A.J. 19 (1948).
56 See Note 2 supra.
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its precise presentation, and give aid and comfort to those
who rejoice in the fact that the crimes against humanity
which they commit as an individual homo sapiens are still
beyond the constitutional pale. In his unneeded asides Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson ignored the late Mr. Justice Harlan's
acute admonition that "a question was never settled until
it was settled right."
However, the opinion of the Chief Justice more than
atones for the disturbing dicta when the problem of state
action is tackled. He recites first the many decisions in
which judicial recognition had been made of the fact that
judicial action is to be regarded as action of the state for
the purposes of the.Fourteenth Amendment.57 Moreover,
the rule thus enunciated in the prior cases has not been con-
fined to unfair judicial action of a purely procedural nature.
State court action enforcing a substantive common-law rule
has sometimes resulted in a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the past.58 Against this background the
Supreme Court then proceeds to extract the rule of the case,
a decision of constitutional law of the utmost importance.
The Court decides that the equal protection provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against dis-
crimination by the states in the enjoyment of property rights,
is violated when the racial restrictive covenants are judi-
cially enforced. "9 The boldness of the Supreme Court's
action can be best appreciated by remembering that never
before had it been even intimated that the action of a state
court in construing a private contract, such as a restrictive
covenant, was state action. But here, said the Supreme
57 68 S. Ct. 836, 842-844. See, e.g., Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880), where the discriminatory exclusion of Negroes
from jury panels by a state judge was struck down as unconstitutional.
58 68 S. Ct. 836, 844. See, e.g., American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312
U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941), where enforcement of state courts
of the common-law policy of the state, which resulted in the restraining of peace-
ful picketing, was held 'to be state action of the sort prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment due process provisions protecting freedom of speech.
59 68 S. Ct. 836, 845.
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Court, "the States have made available to individuals the
full coercive power of government to deny the petitioners,
on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property
rights in premises which petitioners are willing and finan-
cially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to
sell".6 o
Here then is the crux of the decision. Judicial enforce-
ment of a private contract can violate the equal protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment if its effect is to
lend the coercive power of court enforcement in a constitu-
tionally prohibited manner. Now will come the wailing and
gnashing of teeth on the part of those who believe alleged
contract "rights" stand alone and beyond the Constitution.
It would do no good to remind them, in a sense, the case
represents a victory for property rights since a contrary
result would have meant that the valuable contract obliga-
tions of a willing purchaser and equally willing seller were
abrogated.
While the proposition that judicial enforcement of a pri-
vate agreement is state action might shock many, little re-
flection is needed to demonstrate its analytical accuracy, not
to mention its advantages as a means of insuring that the
letter of the Constitution is now revitalized by a large swal-
low from its spirit. After all, the law of contracts is not a
matter of private agreement. The agreements entered into
may be classified as private affairs. However, when resort
is had to a state court seeking enforcement for breach of
such an agreement, it is the law of contracts which then
must be invoked. The law of contracts does not tell what
contracts one must make, but only that if one chooses to act
in a certain way, certain legal consequences will follow.6
The law of contracts like any other positive law is "a general
rule of external human action enforced by a sovereign poli-
80 Ibid.
61 DOWLING, PATTERSON AND POWE.LL, MATERIALS ON LEGAL METHOD 5 (1946).
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tical authority."62 Agreements may reside in the sphere of
private acts; their enforcement by a court invades the
domain of sovereign action and must partake of the constitu-
tional limitations affixed thereto. (Emphasis supplied.) As a
learned colleague of the writer has said:
Any contract between two parties . . . is in its ultimate
significance but an act of specification of the unity of the ad-
ministration of human conduct. As a law making act and,
therefore, an administrative act, this contract is actually an
act of public law.63
To put the matter in a more concrete frame of reference,
law in its broad sense may be compared to an electrical
wiring system. The legal remedy is the light switch; the
wires are the various forms of legal process, judicial, legis-
lative, and administrative; the electricity carried by the
wires is the substantive operation of the law; and the light
which it furnishes is the end result of the process, such as
the judgment, statute, administrative adjudication or rule.
The initiation of a legal remedy is often a private matter;
you must pull the switch in many cases, since its operation
is not always automatic. Once, however, the proper switch
is pulled, the matter becomes one of public cognizance. The
remedy, process, and legal result entailing whatever con-
sequences they do, are all forms of sovereign action. As such,
all are subject to the constitutional safeguards. In institut-
ing suit for enforcement of a restrictive covenant you are
pulling the switch. After that, the matter passes out of the
62 HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 40 (10th Ed., 1906).
63 Chroust, Law And The Administrative Process: An Epistemological Ap-
proach To Jurisprudence, 58 HARv. L. REv. 573, 581 (1945). Professor Chroust
informed this writer in a personal chat that there is a sound- historical basis for
this proposition, in addition to its apparent analytical accuracy. In ancient times
if A agreed to overseer B's land in return for payment in gold and goods upon
completion of the job, what rights did he have if B refused to pay, rejected his
claims, and had A soundly thrashed by his men? If he had no followers, he had
no remedy for enforcement of the agreement. If he had followers, then civil war
or rebellion was his remedy. We sophisticated moderns have substituted judicial
enforcement of agreements for armed attack. Your contract rights in both cases
depend on your remedies. Without them, your private agreement remains simply
chat.
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domain of private affairs and enters into the arena of public
authority. Thus seen, the positive law basis of legal rights
(which, of course, find their fundamental roots in the im-
mutable principles of justice, i.e., natural law) lies in the
remedy afforded by the sovereign. In granting this remedy
through court enforcement, even of private agreements, the
mandates of the Constitution are applicable. The restrictive
covenant decision by the Supreme Court articulates that
proposition beyond question. It is a monumental contribu-
tion to legal theory in general, and to constitutional law
theory in particular.
One final point raised by respondents in the state cases
needs to be met. The argument was pressed that since the
state courts stand ready to enforce restrictive covenants
which exclude white persons from ownership or occupancy
of property, enforcement in the instant case of the covenants
excluding Negroes could not be deemed a denial of equal
protection of the laws. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's rejoinder
to that non sequitur is his best turned phrase since his eleva-
tion to the Supreme Bench. He pithily puts it: "Equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through the indis-
criminate imposition of inequalities". 4 And that is that.
Any alleged pattern of racial restrictions on property im-
posed by Negroes against non-Negroes probably exists only
in the frenzied imaginations of the apostles of intolerance.
Moreover, if true, they would be as unjustified as similar
acts on the part of whites.
Completing discussion of the restrictive covenant decision
requires us to examine briefly the federal case, Hurd v.
Hodge " arising from the District of Columbia. Principal
reliance of petitioners in this case was on the Fifth Amend-
ment due process objection. However, additional arguments
64 68 S. Ct. 836, 846. As one note writer put it, the Negro's "right" to dis-
criminate is as much value to him, "as the right possessed by a creditor whose
cause of action is barred by his debtor's release in bankruptcy." Note, 37 Irnors
B.J. 88 (1948).
65 334 U.S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 857 (1948).
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had been pressed,6" including objections that judicial en-
forcement of the covenants would violate the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and would be contrary to the treaty obligations
of the United Nations charter; enforcement of the cove-
nants would contravene the public policy of the United
States; enforcement of the covenants would be inequitable.
The Court resorted to a familiar technique for avoiding
a ruling on the constitutional issue. It placed its holding on
purely statutory grounds, finding that judicial enforcement
of these discriminatory private agreements is prohibited by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.67 Moreover, the Court indi-
cated that even in the absence of statute judicial enforce-
ment of the restrictive covenants would violate the public
policy of the United States. Chief Justice Vinson felt that
the action by the federal courts was of a nature that if
undertaken by state courts it would be held to be a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The public policy of
the United States requires no less protection for equal pro-
tection of the laws.68
It is to be regretted that the Court hedged in placing their
decision squarely on the constitutional point as they had
done in the state cases. However, since it is beyond legiti-
mate cavil that they would have done so if absolutely neces-
sary, there was no harm in their display of judicial timidity
after such bold and courageous action in the state cases.
This writer is disappointed, however, that the treaty power
argument was not at least discussed. This argument has
been raised in two recent cases involving state legislation
66 68 S. Ct. 847, 849. Although the vote was once again six to nothing, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concurred on the sole ground that it would be inequitable
to enforce these covenants in a federal court.
67 Id. at 852. The Court referred to the historical background of the Civil
Rights Act and correctly concluded that the guarantees of that Act, including
the right to hold property free from discrimination, were the same which the
Fourteenth Amendment later embodied as applicable to the states. See FLAcK,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 94-96.
68 68 S. Ct. 847, 853.
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discriminating against aliens.69 The time is getting ripe for
a precise determination of the question whether federal
action under a bona fide treaty, by the terms of which we
are pledged to eliminate racial discrimination, would prevail
over state imposed discrimination.7" This writer feels that
the only barriers which face an affirmative answer to that
question are the still strong traces of a parochial nationalism.
Maybe the Court was right in postponing the issue till an-
other day. The passage of time and the accumulation of
experience on the part of the United States in active inter-
nationalism ' might make easier the acceptance of the con-
cept that federal action under a valid treaty may be relied
on to restrict racial discrimination masquerading under the
seductive cliche, "states rights."
69 Oyama v. State of California 332 U. S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 257
Adv. (1948), noted in 23 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 409 (1948); and Takahaski v.
Fish and Game Commission et al., 334 U. S. 420, 68 S. Ct. 1143, 92 L. Ed. 1101
Adv. (1948), noted in 24 No=x DAmS LAWYER 119 (1948). In -the Oyama case,
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in his majority opinion impliedly acknowledges the
validity of the treaty power argument. 68 S. Ct. 269, 277. In their con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge recognize the
violence which the discriminatory alien land laws of California do to the char-
ter of the United Nations. Id. at 288. In the Takahaski case, while the
treaty power argument was not alluded to, the general flavor of Mr. Justice
Black's majority opinion and that of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge give definite indication that the hour of its
reception might not he too far in the future.
70 In the opinion of this writer no legal obstacle would seem to stand in the
way. The proposition was early established that a valid treaty overrides con-
flicting state legislation. Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813).
Moreover, the Federal Government may be permitted to act by the treaty power
in cases where it could not act under its other delegated powers. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984 (1920).
See III BoYD, THE EXPANDING TREATY PowER, in III SELEcTED ESSAYS ON CON-
STTUTiONAL LAW 410-435 (1938). The limitations on the use of the treaty
power would appear to be: (1) it must be a bona-fide and not a sham treaty;
(2) there must be a legitimate subject matter of a treaty; (3) the power
given could not be one in contradiction of one of the direct prohibitions of
the Constitution, such as passing an ex post facto law; and (4) -the treaty power
could not be used to impair the federal nature of our form of government. This
last condition is the one which the racial baiters and "haters" might enlarge
and distort in order to prevent federal action taken under the treaty power to
remove discrimination enforced through state action.
71 For an interesting analysis and appraisal of recent achievements of inter-
national legal cooperation on the functional level, see Freeman, International
Administrative Law: A Functional Approach To Peace, 57 YA. L.J. 976 (1948).
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Having completed analysis of the constitutional and
jurisprudential aspects of the Supreme Court's ruling, con-
jecture as to future consequences: legal, economic, and
social, would be in order. There is no doubt that the impor-
tant constitutional point of the case will again rear its head
in litigation to come. Remember, we have accepted the cases
as sound, if novel, authority for .the proposition that a court
may not by its decree achieve a constitutionally prohibited
discriminatory result, even in enforcing a private agreement,
when the same result could not be constitutionally permis-
sible if attempted to be achieved by legislative action. This
is a broad proposition. It covers a vast area. But then
again, the pattern of racial segregation by private agree-
ment is broad. In fact, the Justice Department has demon-
strated that racial covenants as a substitute for legislative
action have far greater effectiveness than the latter method.
Thus the Court may have fashioned nothing less than was
needed for the job. Still, the broad ramifications have given
at least one friendly observer a moment of wonder, if not
apprehension.7" Where the precise logical limitation on the
broad sweep of the doctrine will be applied must remain, for
a while, the disputed theorem of law review soothsayers.
Sprinkling his share of Sibylline leaves, this writer ventures
to say the doctrine that judicial enforcement of private
agreements are subject to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be canalized within the clearly delimited
sphere of civil or personal liberty cases, and will not lap over
into the great expanse of substantive due process, wherein
the fertile fields of contract, tort, equity, administrative law,
et al., might present a plethora of certiorari petitions to
plague the Supreme Court on its stilly night watches as
guardian supreme of the Constitution.75
72 PRETUDICE AND PROPERTY, oP. cit. suPra note 4, at 60-61.
78 Frank, op. cit. supra note 54, at 23.
74 See, e.g., Note, 17 U. oF Cnr. L. Rzv. 277, 282 (1948).
75 The writer's prophecy grows out of a conviction that the Court will con-
tinue to display a zealous attitude in reviewing civil liberty cases, while maintain-
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Moreover, the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court
gives constitutional theory a moral catharsis which it has
long needed. The dry bones of the letter of due process and
equal protection have now been fattened up a bit with the
tough fiber of their spirit. The tonic which did the trick
may have involved some legalistic hair splitting on the part
of the Court who administered it. Nevertheless, the vivifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment by our top oracle, the
American Delphi, should have its ramifications in our juris-
prudence and in the social conditioning of the American
people, 6 and as a persuasive advertisement to our foreign
neighbors that we "practice what we preach" when we cru-
sade for human rights on the international level.
There have been several lower court decisions since the
Supreme Court spoke. In one, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court decision and refused to en-
force racial restrictive covenants. No opinion was written
by the reversing court. The order simply reversed on the
authority of the Shelley case.77 In New Jersey the Court of
Chancery followed the Shelley case in holding restrictive
covenants unenforceable. The reason assigned was that
"action by state courts in the enforcement of such agree-
ments" was prohibited on the authority of the United States
ing an attitude of judicial self restraint in approaching questions which involve
allegations of the deprivation of property rights. The grand paradox in the
Holmes tradition will continue to manifest itself in the present Court. At least,
that is a hopeful personal conviction. See Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil
Liberties And The Holmes Tradition, 32 CORN.L.Q. 177, 220 (1946); PRrrcHErr,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 286-287; and Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, 35
Fortune 78 (1947) for corroboratory views. In fact, this belief gains added
weight out of the restrictive covenant decisions themselves. Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, whose first year on the bench had not produced any startling displays
of his admiration for civil liberty, wrote the instant opinions. Having sired a
radical doctrine for the defense of human rights, his abandonment of it seems
unlikely.
76 The law can never equal ethics, but it can approximate that goal. Last
year aroused community pressure caused the dismissal of suit brought on a
restrictive covenant to compel a Gentile wife to evict her Jewish husband. The
husband, overwhelmed by the tremendous wave of sympathy and offers of assist-
ance, announced that he had renewed faith "in the essential decency of people."
Newsweek, Sept. 29, 1947, p. 29.
77 Kemp v. Rubin, 297 N. Y. 955, 80 N.E. (2d) 350 (1948).
RACIAL RESTRICTIONS IN REAL ESTATE
Supreme Court decision.7" New Jersey courts might very
well have reached the same result by relying on a provision
of their new State Constitution (effective Jan. 1, 1948)
which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of a civil
right.79
However, while the legal protections surrounding the pat-
tern of racial segregation in real estate have been irrevocably
impaired, if not entirely vitiated, nevertheless the social and
economic barriers remain almost unscathed. The vicious
practice of racial segregation, reenforced up to now by the
sheriff's writ, has eaten deeply into the moral core of our
society. The Negro ghetto has become, unfortunately, "an
accepted part of the American landscape".80 It maintains
its position by many lines of defense, of which the restric-
tive covenant has been classified as the least effective, far
inferior in its coercive power -than others.81 A hypocritical
code of real estate "ethics" insures few, if any, sales by a
white vendor to a "non-Caucasian" purchaser. However, it
can be noted that in a falling, deflationary market these
alleged protectors of "white supremacy" seem easily able to
violate the tacit provisions of their own unwritten under-
standings.
However, if a Negro purchaser does manage to find a
willing white seller he usually finds almost insurmountable
the problem of mortgage financing and construction credit.
78 Rich v. Jones, 142 N. J. Eq. 215, 59 A (2d) 839 (1948).
79 "No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right,
nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor
be segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious prin-
ciples, race, color, ancestry, or national origin." N. J. CONST. Art. I, § S. This
same provision had been relied on by New Jersey's governor to sustain that
state's policy of non-segregation in the state militia even when under federal
control during training periods. The War Department, which has pursued a
policy of segregation in the armed forces, bowed to state sovereignty in this
matter. New York Times, Feb. 9, 1948, p. 9. It is refreshing to see the concept
of "states rights" being applied, as Jefferson intended it to be, to promote the
equality of human dignity. Too often it has been perverted and used as a pro-
tective facade for human oppression.
80 AsBRAs, RACE BIAs IN HousING 5 (1947).
81 See Frank, op. cit. supra note 54, at 24.
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The property suddenly becomes less valuable although the
rate of return, if leased, would usually be higher.82 Even
the Federal Housing Administration until recently has im-
pliedly sanctioned racial restriction in real estate by their
mortgage underwriting practices. 3. Happily, recent success-
ful anti-trust prosecution against the Mortgage Conference
of New York indicates that the weapon of discrimination in
mortgage financing may be breaking down. A consent decree
judgment was obtained in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York which prohibits thirty-three
banks, trust companies, and insurance companies from get-
ting together with other mortgage lenders to engage in vari-
ous restrictive and discriminatory practices in placing in the
New York City area. For the purposes of this article, the
most relevant of the practices now outlawed was the lack
of competition for mortgages on property owned by certain
racial or religious minorities.8" It is hoped that we are wit-
nessing the demolition of another line of defense in the
fortress of intolerance and racial discrimination.
Unhappily, other more powerful protective battlements
remain. The most potent of all, of course, is voluntary ad-
herence to a community practice of racial or religious segre-
gation in housing.8 5 Here the problem becomes one of ethics,
an individual tussle with conscience. In this sphere, the
operative effects of the positive law in breaking down real
estate segregation are dull and ineffective instruments. Only
a long-range experience in peaceful and harmonious inter-
82 Walter White points out that when Negro tenants are taken in, owners
profit through lower taxes, decreased expenditures for upkeep, and are able to
break one-family dwellings down into many multiple units yielding a higher
total rent. WHITE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 45.
83 To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CivIL RIGHTS 68 (1947).
84 United States v. The Mortgage Conference of New York et al, Civil
Action No. 37-247, June 16, 1948.
85 For the reaction of some local realtors to the Supreme Court's ruling in
the instant cases see New Republic, Sept. 20, 1948, p. 29. Purchase of a home
in a fashionable district of Los Angeles by the Negro musician, King Cole, touched
off a storm of local protest recently. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 1, 1948, p. 5.
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racial neighborhood social exchanges can serve to introduce
the day when societal ethics corresponds with the great
democratic spirit of the Constitution.
Even when voluntary adherence fails to hold the color
line there are ugly, more violent methods of enforcing the
collective will of neighborhood bigotry. Examples of mob
violence against Negro purchasers are all too well established
on the black escutcheon of America's history to be denied. 6
Moreover the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights has come
forth with a documented account of mob violence, police
indifference, and mounting tension, which were set off re-
cently by the Negro purchase of property in the Hamilton-
Boulevard area of Detroit." Fortunately, the occurrences
of such incidents seem to be diminishing as the realization
grows that the presence of "non-Caucasian" neighbors will
not cause the sky to fall, nor herald the arrival of the Inter-
regnum. 8 The experience of several large cities, including
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, with
mixed occupancy housing projects has demonstrated that
interracial harmony can flourish in non-segregated housing
patterns.8 9
Having digressed for some length on the social and eco-
nomic obstacles which dot the long and difficult path to
democracy in American housing patterns, it would be appro-
priate to return to the legal aspects of the situation. One
86 See, e.g., Waiter White's dramatic and tragic portrayal of the Sweet affair,
a terrible episode of race hate and violence directed toward Negro purchasers of
property in what had been considered a "restricted" area. WHm, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 72-79.
87 PROTEST DEmONSTRATIONS AGAnsT NEGRO OccuPANcy, Bulletin by the
Detroit Chapter of the Michigan Committee On Civil Rights, Sept. 30, 1948,
pp. 1-5. The Most Rev. Francis J. Haas, Bishop of Grand Rapids, is Honorary
Chairman of this Committee.
88 See, e.g., supra note 76.
89 "Where Negroes are integrated with whites into self-contained communi-
ties without segregation, reach daily contact with their co-tenants, are given the
same privileges and share the same responsibilities, initial latent tensions tend
to subside, distinctions become reconciled, cooperation ensues and an environment
is created in which interracial harmony will be effected." ABRAmS, op. cit. supra
note 80, at 22.
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thing is certain. The Supreme Court's ruling in the instant
case, while it may have broken the back of the legal im-
pediments to non-discrimination in housing facilities avail-
able to minority groups, does not mean that those who resist
democracy on this front have given up. Unfortunately, there
are many lawyers with a full bag of legal stratagems who
will lead a last ditch fight for the continued legal sanctioning
of immorality. There are many possible devices which may
appear as the legal rearguard action of "operation bigotry"
tries vainly to circumvent the Constitutional mandate. The
following pages contain some of them. They should be
appraised from two points of view: (1) Are they constitu-
tional, and in all other respects legal? (2) Are they practical
from the aspects of financial considerations of expediency?
The first possibility that suggests itself is the ordinary
legal remedy of a damage suit against a seller who has sold
in violation of a restrictive covenant. However, it would
appear from a literal reading of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the instant case that judicial enforcement of the
covenant by awarding money damages would be under the
constitutional prohibitions equally with judicial enforcement
in equity." Usually, the restrictive covenant contains a pro-
vision for liquidated damages for its breach."' It appears as
only an alternative method to enforce the racial discrimina-
tion. As such, its enforcement would be state official action
and it would seem, according to the analysis previously made
herein, that it must undergo the same tests of constitution-
ality. In this regard, it is obviously defective.92 Moreover,
since money damages would hardly suffice as the real ob-
jective sought in these cases, the utility of the ordinary
90 " . .. the Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand
action by the state which results in the denial of equal protection to other
individuals." 68 S. Ct. 836, 846. See Miller, op. cit. supra note 13, at 601.
91 There was a $2,000 penalty for breach of the covenant in one of the
instant cases. The Court paid no heed to it.
92 At least two other writers agree. Miller, op. cit. supra note 13, at 601;
Constitutionality of Enforcing Racial Covenants 17 U. or Cn;. L. REV. 277, 282
(1948).
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liquidated damage provision would be very small. If the
damages were set at a very high figure they would act as
too great a deterrent to prospective purchasers, who might
contemplate that in a deflationary market at some future
day they might only be too glad to sell to a willing "non-
Caucasian" vendee. Furthermore, a prohibitive damage
provision in the covenant would in all likelihood be construed
as a penalty bond and hence unenforceable.93 The damage
suit as a means of preserving a pattern of segregation in
real estate seems constitutionally defective, and inefficacious
from pragmatic considerations of the realities of real estate
markets.
Another possible variation of the damage suit may be
attempted. Future restrictive covenants may require that
purchasers of the property give a cash deposit or bond to
insure compliance with the covenant.94 Thus, if the restric-
tive covenant is violated by one of the signers he may be
penalized through forfeiture of the cash he had deposited
when he signed the covenant. This method of securing the
aim of racial restriction seems exposed to the same twin
defects which were in a suit for money damages. A suit to en-
force the cash or bond requirements would be a resort to en-
forcement through state or public action and would seem to
be outlawed by the principle of the Shelley case for the
reasons advanced ante. On the other hand, if the money
was required in advance and a suit is instituted by the
vendor for the return of the forfeiture bond, the picture is not
so clear. No federal cause of action appears, and, unless these
covenants were considered void per se as against the public
policy of the state, the suit for recovery might well be un-
successful. Even if the policy of the state prohibited the
racial restrictive covenant, recovery of the cash deposit might
be denied on the theory that the parties are in pari-delicto.
93 In such a case the damage clause dearly would be not a pre-estimate of
the damage suffered by sale to the restricted minority, but merely a deterrent to
prevent breach and thus a "penalty". See McCoRi'cx, DAMAGES 599 (1935).
94 Real Estate: Exclusive-Restricted, United States News, May 14, 1948, p. 22.
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A realistic court, however, might take the view that such a
penalty deposit was extracted under the duress of an almost
unbreakable sellers' market in real estate. The real barrier,
however, to the widespread use of the forfeiture bond as a
circumvention of the Supreme Court's mandate is not legal,
but practical. If the amount required to be put up in ad-
vance is too high, it would deter sales, and could be used
only in very high price property areas. If the deposit re-
quired is small it may pay the prospective vendor to sell
and forfeit the deposit. This would be especially true in
today's inflationary real estate market.
Another device which may come into its own as an escape
from conformance to constitutionality is the insertion of a
covenant giving the original sub-divider of a real estate de-
velopment power to approve or disapprove of future pur-
chasers and occupants. Even if this plan were free of legal
objections its utility would be confined to new develop-
ments. Moreover, the restraints imposed by the covenant
are very broad in nature and theoretically could be used to
bar any purchaser who incurred the disfavor of the original
sub-divider. The hazardous implications of such an extreme-
ly vague and general power would cut down the sales attrac-
tiveness of almost any property which was subject to it.
In addition to the practical disutility of this scheme there
are certain legal objections that make its widespread adop-
tion an unlikely probability. The rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation would seem to be directly in point
here. Provisions which forbid alienation except with the
consent of designated persons have been held invalid.95 The
usual rule is that an equitable servitude which runs with the
land, if unreasonable, will violate the rule against restraints
on alienation." It is submitted that a covenant giving un-
limited power to the original sub-divider to reject any pur-
chaser would violate that rule. For the same reasons it is
95 Gladstone Mt. Mining Co. v. Tweedel, 132 Wash. 441, 232 Pac. 306 (1925).
90 CLARx, CovENm N RuNNiNO wITH THE LANDo 137 (1929).
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believed a covenant forbidding purchase or occupancy of
property by persons not approved by the majority of the
five nearest neighbors would be void.
Another variation of the two plans just discussed is the
"club" arrangement. A "club" might be established consist-
ing of the local property owners who might either own all
the land in the area concerned and lease it to desired occu-
pants or have the right, under a covenant, to pass upon pur-
chasers and occupants. Such an arrangement would hardly
appeal to owners of property in fee simple who would, in all
probability, take an unenthusiastic view of this surrender
of ownership. The possibilities of the employment of this
plan might be somewhat more real, however, in the case of
future new real estate developments. Nevertheless, it is ex-
posed to two objections from the legal point of view. If the
ownership of the land by the "club" was merely technical,
concealing the real purpose of the arrangement, it seems
very probable that the present Supreme Court would pierce
the fake covering of legality and deny enforcement of the
covenant as an attempt to obtain indirectly the enforcement
of a racial restrictive covenant where it could not be achieved
directly. The Constitution applies equally to "sophisticated
as well as unsophisticated" violations of its broad provisions
of principle. In addition, if the "club" preserved the power,
through a covenant, to pass upon purchaser and occupants,
the rule against restraints on alienation would loom as a
probable barrier to legality. 98
Another slight variation of the scheme to vest control in
local property owners would be to use the corporate form.
It would appear that this contrivance is exposed to the same
legal and practical weaknesses which, it has been suggested,
afflict the other types of "neighbor control" devices. Per-
haps the creation of a land trust, under which all property
would be conveyed to a title company which would not deed
97 Supra note 95 and 96.
98 Supra p. 184.
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any parcel of land to an unwanted person, might be a more
efficacious method of preserving "Caucasian culture". Yet,
this idea too suffers from the fact that few home owners
would desire to subject their right to sell to the necessarily
vague, and perhaps arbitrary authority of another.
The use of the fee simple determinable may perhaps fur-
nish an out for those who would seek to detour around the
restrictive covenant decisions. A conveyance vesting a fee
simple in the grantee, until a certain specified event happens,
at which time the fee automatically reverts to the grantor or
his successors, is a fee simple determinable. It is true that
here also title reverts automatically, upon the occurrence of
the event. However, application of the fee simple determin-
able device to racial grohibitions is a horse of another color.
In the first place, attention has already been called to the
fact that the Supreme Court acutely distinguished' in the
restrictive covenant cases between a restriction on a class
of purchaser or occupant (user) as opposed to one on the
use of the property. Enforcement of the former is uncon-
stitutional, of the latter, constitutional, if reasonable. If
the Negro purchaser refused to vacate the premises after
the sale to him which would be the event causing the deter-
mination of the fee, a writ of entry or suit for ejectment
would be necessary. Judicial enforcement would be public
action and as such subject to the infirmity of violating the
equal protection clause. Moreover, the sale price of property
subject to this type of forfeiture clause would have to be set
quite low to induce future purchasers to buy under such
onerous possibility of reverter and loss of ownership.
The same objections, with perhaps more force, apply to
a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, for breach of
which the grantor has a right of entry. Here, the fee does
not terminate in the grantee automatically, but remains in
the grantee until the grantor has exercised the right of entry
reserved to him for breach of condition subsequent.
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A proposal which, according to information received from
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People,99 has actually been put forward in Washington,
D. C., merits explanation. Under this plan, a seller would
notify a group of persons previously selected by the various
local property owners of the respective sale. That person
would then get a report of the prospective purchaser and if
in the minds of the other residents the purchaser was un-
desirable, they would seek to find a new purchaser and could
join together to buy the property themselves. Although there
does not seem to be any legal flaw in this form of voluntary
action on the part of property holders, it is obvious that the
tremendous economic burden it would place on the partici-
pants to it make its use purely theoretical save in the very
expensive neighborhoods where more subtle and more effec-
tive forms of Caucasian self preservation make resort to it
unnecessary."00
Another scheme which has received some publicity in the
District of Columbia area is the "square captain" plan.101
The proposal calls for the appointment of "square captains",
each one of whom would voluntarily be given options on the
property in his area. If a property owner wishes to sell he
would notify the "captain" giving him the name of the
prospective buyer and the sale price. If upon investigation
the prospective buyer is found to be "undesirable" the "cap-
tain" exercises his option and buys the house, actually not
for himself, but for a more "desirable" buyer. The main
defects in effective utilization of this scheme are practical
ones. The protection it would give to those who participated
would be largely illusory. False offers to buy would be easy
99 Letter received by the writer from Marian Wynn Perry, Assistant Special
Counsel of the NA.A.C.P. Legal Defense, July 8, 1948.
100 Realtor "ethics", discrimination in mortgage and construction financing,
and high purchase prices, are already holding the color line so well in such areas
that any further protection would be merely gilding the "white" lily.
101 Letter received from Dixie Duke, Executive Assistant of the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Boards, Washington, D. C. ,June 11, 1948.
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to arrange and when substantial economic pressure made a
change in the neighborhood inevitable, the restrictors would
soon find themselves unable to take up all the options. More-
over, if a vendor sold in violation of the contract right be-
stowed by the option, a suit to set the sale aside might run
into grave constitutional difficulties. 2 Possibly too, the de-
fense of "no consideration" might be available to the recal-
citrant vendor. Moreover, an option to purchase realty is
regarded in real property law as creating a future interest
contingent upon exercise of the option. Thus, if there is a
possibility that it will not be exercised within the time period
prescribed by the Rule against Perpetuities the option would
be void.0 8
One final stratagem in the arsenal of those who would
circumvent the mandate of the equal protection clause is the
"high occupancy standard" plan. Under this idea covenants
would be inserted to require high occupancy standards, such
as those governing the minimum cost of dwellings, the num-
ber of occupants per room, the type of construction, etc. In
the main such covenants are perfectly legal and, in fact,
socially advantageous in preserving the stability, appearance,
and beauty of residential living. This type of covenant, how-
ever, would be of little value in maintaining a segregated
racial pattern. Moreover, if these covenants were broadened
and specifically applied to the type of purchaser, such as
one requiring him to have a college degree, they would very
likely run afoul of the rule against restraints on alienation.
Furthermore, their utility as added bulwarks against infil-
tration by "non-Caucasians" would decrease as expanding
educational and economic opportunities increase for the
members of minority groups who, up to now, have been held
back in those fields.
102 Unless the "square captain" could demonstrate that he wished to pur-
chase the property for his own use, which is obviously not the case, a court of
equity would probably require that he be content with his remedy at law for
damages.
108 See, e.g., Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914).
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These are some of the devices that may be resorted to in
a desperate effort to preserve "Anglo-Saxon" dominance in
housing accommodations. There may be others. From this
writer's view all appear to be deficient, in one respect or
another, for successful accomplishment of their socially
reprehensible purpose. Some are financially impossible to
carry out on any large scale. Others would frighten the home
owner who does not like others to control his power of sale.
Others, while practically possible, seem to be clearly illegal
for a variety of reasons. Some would offend the constitu-
tional prohibitions which inhere in the equal protection
clause. A few encounter other legal obstacles, such as the
rule against restraints on alienation, or the Rule against.
Perpetuities. It would appear then, that the Supreme Court's
decision in the restrictive covenant cases cannot be circum-
vented by new legalisms artfully conceived by shrewd law-
yers. At least here subterfuge cannot be substituted for
social justice and constitutional principle.
Conclusion
This writer's survey of the restrictive covenant decisions
and surrounding problems has led him to a number of con-
clusions, some of which may still be only minority conjec-
tures. The Supreme Court's decision is a landmark in con-
stitutional law and jurisprudential theory. The proposition
is now firmly established that judicial enforcement of what
would otherwise be purely private agreements is state action
which must be exercised within the protective enclose of
the constitution. What the limits to the doctrine are must
await the judgment of accumulated experience as reflected
in the cases to come. Suffice to say this writer hopes they
will be broad enough to successfully accomplish the very
great task of helping to achieve the ideal of equality of
human dignity in America.
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The decision sounds the death knell for all racial restric-
tive covenants and related superficially legal schemes as
effective weapons in enforcing racial discrimination in hous-
ing accommodations. All are found wanting, either because
of their illegality or their disutility. Unfortunately, this does
not mean that we are now on the verge of achieving real
democracy in real estate opportunities. Community preju-
dice, re-enforced by voluntary adherence to written and un-
written agreements or customs, will, perhaps, continue to
make America safe for hypocrisy. Perhaps, the expected
appearance of "fair housing practices" statutes will soften the
community's will to resist." 4 Still, mob violence and the
other more ugly manifestations of intolerance may persist
for a while as the throbbing conscience prickers of our socie-
tal soul.
No great change in the race patterns of America's housing
accommodations will come overnight. The Negro purchaser
can now drive a sharper bargain and, as a result, prices in
Negro neighborhoods will drop. However, the Negro who
seeks entrance into the holy of holies, a "white neighbor-
hood" still must face onerous difficulties. Yet, as more people
come to realize that there are no areas now legally "safe"
from Negro infiltration, if law enforcement agencies are vigi-
lant in their duty to protect the Negro purchaser from mob
violence, and as the experience of peaceful inter-racial com-
munities accumulates, America will finally remove this curse
on its honor. We will have heeded the bitter admonition of
Christ: "Woe unto ye hypocrites". On the national level
we will have achieved the goal, which, the historian Toyn-
bee has said, is our prime objective on the international
plane; that is, we will have reversed the bitter paradox of
history which shows that, up to now, "Man has been a
104 Maslow and Robison, A Civil Rights Program For America, 7 LAW.
GUUZ REV. 3 (1947). See also Chicago Sun-Times, December 2, 1948, for an
account of a proposed municipal ordinance in Chicago which would forbid racial
segregation in housing.
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dazzling success in the field of the intellect and 'know how'
and a dismal failure in the things of the spirit. ." o In-
deed, the road ahead is long and arduous for those who
must traverse it, but the sun of human liberty is already
slightly visible from where we stand. Let us walk on again,
but faster, for the gathering clouds of a possible atomic dis-
aster make haste imperative.
Alfred Long Scanlan.
105 TOYNBEZ, CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL 262 (1948). Recent manifestation that
the Protestant American clergy is alive to the great task to be performed along
these lines, is evident in a powerful statement issued by the Federal Council of
the Churches of Christ in America. The Council condemned all racial segregation
and called upon all its members to fight bias in every area of the national scene.
New York Times, Dec. 4, 1948, p. 1. Catholic clergymen like Bishops Haas and
Shiel have been in the vanguard of the fight against racial restrictive covenants,
basing their opposition upon points of Catholic doctrine. Swm r, op. cit. supra
note S.
